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A SIMULATION THEORY OF MUSICAL
EXPRESSIVITY
Tom Cochrane
This paper examines the causal basis of our ability to attribute emotions to
music, developing and synthesizing the existing arousal, resemblance and
persona theories of musical expressivity to do so. The principal claim is that
music hijacks the simulation mechanism of the brain, a mechanism which has
evolved to detect one’s own and other people’s emotions.
1. Introduction
Listeners to music can often make confident judgments regarding its
expressive content. Yet they may well be unable to articulate how the music
has this effect. Thus when explaining how it is that music is expressive of
emotions, one must carefully distinguish the experience that allows one to
form judgments of expressive content from the causal basis of this
experience. Several existing theories have something to say about both
questions, and confusions can often arise regarding their compatibility as a
result. In particular, I will argue that the principal alternative theories—the
arousal, resemblance and persona theories—can all be synthesized with
regard to a detailed picture of the causal mechanisms involved. This
synthesis can moreover point us towards the account of the experience best
supported by the causal story. Thus the goal of this paper is not to analyse
in detail the experience of musical expressivity—for instance, the ways in
which this experience subjectively varies, or how distinctive and fleshed out
the perceived emotion seems to be. The goal is rather to present a coherent
and plausible causal story that takes us up to the point at which the
experience emerges.
Despite this focus, however, several arguments that I make about the
causal mechanisms involved are partially justified by basic and fairly
uncontroversial facts about the experience that they generate. We should,
after all, be guided by the experience that the causal story is intended to
support. In particular, we should note that, whilst it is certainly possible to
judge a work as sad or happy in a purely conventional or inferred way, the
central experience of musical expressivity is to have an immediate
impression, sometimes of an extremely vivid nature, of an occurrent
emotional state. We seem to hear in the music an emotion that is temporally
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developing, that modulates in quality and varies in intensity in the ways that
everyday emotions do.
Thus two basic features of the experience of musical expressivity are
assumed here: first, that we have an impression of an occurrent, temporally
developing emotional state, and second, that this emotional state seems
somehow to be a property of the music, i.e. our experience is focused on the
qualities of the music. Cases where tunes judged to be say, cheerful, owing to
their similarity to tunes conventionally regarded as cheerful, are then taken
ultimately to be parasitic upon experiences of occurrent emotions in music
of the kind I have outlined.
An additional grounding feature of this account is its assumption of a
theory of emotions that takes patterns of bodily changes to be essential.
Several other accounts of expressivity, it seems to me, are needlessly
encumbered by theories in which conceptual judgments are taken as central
to emotional states, where bodily changes and the feelings of those changes
are relegated to a peripheral role at best. Yet it is much easier to account for
the strength and immediacy of musical expression when you regard feelings
rather than judgments as central to emotions.
In particular I adopt a perceptual theory of emotions of the kind
presented by Prinz [2004] and Deonna [2006]. These theories recognize that
bodily changes are necessary for emotions. Yet they also recognize that the
function of an emotion like fear is to represent danger, allowing the subject
to avoid or manage that danger. Thus perceptual theories further claim that
bodily changes can represent the meaningful, intentional content of the
emotion. Bodily changes such as increased heart rate, or even overt
behaviour, like running away, can represent danger because they are set up
by evolution or learning to be causally initiated by dangerous situations.
This allows them to reliably track the presence of danger for the subject.
Different perceptual theories then make sense of how bodily feelings could
really be about danger in different ways. On the view I prefer, the intentional
object (danger) should only be identified with features of the external
environment in so far as those features are felt to physically impact on the
bodily organism. The situation, say a bull charging towards me, is less the
direct cause and content of my fear than is the imagined impact of the bull
upon my body, which triggers bodily responses to flee or resist. By triggering
these reactions, the charging bull highlights the danger, my bodily
vulnerability, but the sense of impact and my bodily reaction to this impact
more directly form the content of my representation of danger. So the view
is that emotions perceive the status of the organism by means of bodily
feelings and reactions.1 This, I think, makes sense of the claim that bodily
feelings are doing the perceptual work.
Now on this view, bodily changes include changes to the respiratory
system, circulatory system, digestive system, musculoskeletal system, the
endocrine system, and the release of neuro-transmitters (such as serotonin).
Any and all bodily changes that generate feelings can potentially be
1See Cochrane [unpublished] for a detailed exposition and defence of this view. Note that the perception of
the status of the organism is necessary and sufficient for the emotion, though a conceptual appraisal of the
situation that triggers the bodily reaction may be considered part of the complete emotional state.
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incorporated within the emotion because one’s overall bodily feeling is
causally as well as experientially associated with the status of the bodily
organism. So, for instance, facial and vocal expressions, despite their
probable evolution for communicative purposes, also partly constitute
emotional states because they are bodily changes that feel a certain way. It is
thus unsurprising that by regulating facial and vocal expressions one can
regulate emotions, affecting both subjective self-reports and other signs of
physiological arousal (such as skin-conductance) which are presumably
associated at a sub-personal level with those behavioural expressions.2 On
this view we might also admit all kinds of tactile sensations into the
emotional state. Feelings such as pressure, movement and heat are typical
features of emotional experience. Hence even things like the feel of a cold
winter’s day or a fur coat could potentially be incorporated within the
emotional state because they directly affect the sense of impact on one’s
body and could thereby modify the experience of an emotion.
Apart from the bodily changes which constitute emotions, we must also
include as their realizing base the neural functions responsible for initiating
and controlling these changes. In particular, according to neurologists such
as Antonio Damasio [2000; 2004], the brain continuously maps the overall
state of the body. This serves several functions. First, it provides centralized
regulation for the suite of emotional responses. Second, it is most likely the
immediate basis of the conscious feeling of the emotion. And third, it
enables bodily changes (and the feeling of those changes) to be anticipated
or simulated in the absence of actual physiological changes. This
mechanism, which Damasio calls the ‘as-if loop’, enables subjects to react
more quickly than we might expect some of the changes (such as hormonal
changes) to occur, as well as to map the temporal development of one’s
bodily status. As I shall detail below, it is also heavily implicated in our
capacity to empathize with others.
Given this picture of emotions, we are now left with the problem of how
(purely instrumental) music could possibly express emotions when it neither
presents the situations that cause emotions, nor has a body. The solution
that several theorists have come up with is to compare the way we recognize
emotions in music with the way we recognize emotions in other people. The
general reasoning behind this is that we are able to recognize the emotion of
another without being aware of what causes it. We are also able to make
such recognitions based purely on audible or visual information. The
various theories of expression then elaborate this comparison in different
ways. With regard to the causal story, I think they all contribute a part of
the picture, which in combination with recent empirical data we can now
piece together. Accordingly, this presentation must range across a variety of
different theories and the overall picture may thereby appear rather
complex. Yet we can summarize the theory by its appeal to our capacity
for empathy, in particular, the kind of empathy whereby we recognize
someone’s emotion by perceiving their expressive behaviour. In a manner
most compatible with the above view of emotions, this kind of empathy is
2See Laird [2007] for an extensive review.
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grounded in the simulation of bodily patterns. For this reason I’ve labelled it
a simulation theory of musical expressivity.3
2. The Necessity of Arousal
The first piece of our causal story is provided by the arousal theory of
musical expressivity, a sophisticated version of which is offered by
Matravers [1990]. According to this theory, the way to overcome the
problem that music presents an occurrent emotion without presenting a
person who possesses that emotion is simply to find a real person to whom
we can attach it. In particular, arousal theory suggests that the listener is
able to apply an emotional label to the music on the basis of his or her own
emotional reaction. Then, in order to preserve the fact that our response is
still guided by and focused on the music, Matravers makes an analogy with
our reactions to emotionally expressive people. In cases where we perceive
that another person is undergoing an emotion, he claims that we typically
mirror that person’s emotion or feel an emotion complementary to it. The
same is then said to be true of expressive music.
I will not address here the criticisms that arousal is insufficient to properly
discern the expressive qualities of music. The most common criticism is to
attack the necessity of arousal for judging the expressive quality of music.
Many critics complain that they are perfectly capable of recognising the
emotional quality of a piece of music without actually being aroused by that
emotion, or any other emotion complementary to it. Certainly we might
admit that people can be aroused by music, but that is far from saying that it
is necessary for us to be aroused. It does not even seem to be the paradigm
case of musical expressivity.
Matravers responds by saying that this criticism assumes too strong an
idea of arousal, as if the feeling must overwhelm the listener; instead, merely
the barest beginnings of feeling are sufficient for arousal. I think this is right,
but the answer needs refining. In order to recognize an emotion in another
person, and similarly in music, it is necessary to be aroused by either
attenuated bodily changes or, which is more primary, a neural simulation of
such changes.
Supporting this conclusion is empirical evidence that when people become
unable to experience a particular emotion, they develop a corresponding
inability to recognize that emotion in others. Antonio Damasio describes the
case of ‘S’ who, owing to damage to her amygdala, simultaneously lost the
ability to feel fear and recognize the expression of fear in others [2000: 62–5].
A similar inability to feel disgust and recognize it in others has also been
observed in patients with Huntington’s disease [Goldman & Sripada 2005].
More evidence comes from studies of subjects suffering from Parkinson’s
3Note that simulation theory has been applied to artistic expression before, most notably by Currie and
Ravenscroft [2002] and Currie [2004]. Yet the kind of simulation that Currie and Ravenscroft appeal to is
based on adopting pretend beliefs and desires, which, when processed by one’s own cognitive machinery,
output certain emotional states that one can then attribute to the target. This is the kind of empathy that one
may engage in when the other person is absent, and is highly suitable for literary presentations.
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disease, a disorder that affects the brain’s production of the neurotransmit-
ter dopamine. Since levels of dopamine rise when engaging in aggressive
behaviour, this neurotransmitter has been linked with the capacity for
feeling anger. As such it has been noted that when Parkinson’s patients stop
taking L-Dopa, the drug that enables dopamine production to be restored,
they correspondingly lose the ability both to be angry as well as to recognize
that emotion in others [Lawrence et al. 2007]. Being able to selectively turn
on and off both the arousal and recognition of anger by regulating one
specific neurotransmitter entails that it is a necessary pre-requisite of both
phenomena, and hence that they share neural processes.
Furthermore, I agree with Matravers that the arousal involved need only
be of a highly attenuated nature. There might only be the beginnings of
muscle tension, expressive movements, or other somatic changes. More
importantly, we can appeal to Damasio’s as-if loop. It is only necessary for
the brain to recreate or simulate the bodily changes or expressive behaviour
involved in an emotional state to trigger the feeling of those changes. Given
the function of this mechanism to regulate our physiological responses, such
simulation may or may not then go on to trigger the associated actual
changes.
Still the critic may complain that even an attenuated or simulated bodily
response should generate feeling and he just doesn’t seem to have that
feeling. However, this ignores the phenomenology of empathic states. When
we recognize (at least strong) emotions in others, we do not need to infer
from their expressions to any ‘hidden’ inner feelings. Rather we get a direct
impression of the feeling in their face or body; we seem to perceive the
emotion itself externalized. So the idea is that when recreating the aroused
response of another, this arousal is usually experienced not as something we
feel in ourselves, but as something belonging to the other person.
This kind of ‘projective’ perception requires some elaboration. First of all,
we note that the observer’s arousal is geared towards tracking the emotion
of the other person. It is perfectly intelligible by causal theories of
representation, such as Fred Dretske’s [1981; 1986], that the perceptual state
should represent the original cause, the other person, as having the emotion,
rather than any of the intermediate stages involved, i.e. my various
physiological arousal mechanisms. Compare this to touching a hot or
vibrating surface, where despite the fact that we only perceive these qualities
due to the transduction of heat or vibrations into our fingertips, we perceive
the heat or movement as belonging to the surface, not as belonging to our
fingertips. Similarly, we can distinguish between cases of perceiving the
arousal of another and feeling personally aroused in just the same way as we
can distinguish cases of touching a hot surface and having hot fingers after
having removed one’s hand. In both cases, the additional contextual and
perceptual information (e.g. seeing the other person, or the hot surface), as
well as the differential capacity to stop attending to the phenomenon, helps
to locate the quality appropriately.
So similarly in the case of music, the listener’s arousal is supposed to track
the expressive qualities of the music. This should lead to a direct impression
of the emotion in the music rather than a self-conscious impression of
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personal arousal (though such an impression is certainly possible, especially
in very intense cases). This seems to be a faithful description of what it’s like
to recognize the expressive properties of music.
It is also this argument from the phenomenology of empathy that
convinces me that arousal (in some form) occurs at the moment of
recognition, rather than merely similar neural machinery underlying both
recognition and arousal. If we are getting a sense of an occurrent emotion
expressed by the music, or the other person, then, given that we don’t
directly receive the sensations of others, what else could provide the
phenomenology of the feeling? 4 Even if we employed a memory of a past
emotion, recreating the felt quality of a bodily pattern would require at least
a neural recreation of arousal. If no arousal takes place, it is difficult to see
what else could provide a sense of the feeling in the music, or the other
person.
So I claim that to recreate another’s bodily changes and projectively
perceive the feeling that results as belonging to the other is what it is to
empathize with someone in this way. One could not be directly aware of the
other person’s emotion (though one might infer it by other means) without
undergoing this process.5 Matravers is thus on the right track when he
claims that arousal is necessary to recognising emotions in music. Being (at
least sub-personally) aroused by an emotion that mirrors the one expressed
by the music will allow us to perceive the music as possessing that emotional
quality. However, it seems clear that feeling personally aroused is not a
necessary part of the experience of perceiving the emotional content of
music. At most, arousal is a necessary part of the causal process. Thus the
kind of arousal that I am appealing to here may not be that which would be
endorsed by a traditional arousal theorist.
Furthermore, by focusing more on the listener than the music itself,
arousal theory does not provide a very informative explanation of exactly
what it is about the music that encourages its treatment in emotional terms.
How is it that music can generate the arousal of the listener? In order to
answer this question we must turn to resemblance theory. Again, our answer
will appeal to a deeper explanation of how patterns of bodily changes are
simulated in our empathic activities.
3. Arousal Relies on Resemblance
There are several types of resemblance theory that differ according to what
emotional phenomenon music is supposed to resemble. One idea, provided
by both Peter Kivy [1980] and Stephen Davies [1994], is that music
resembles the ways in which humans give expression to their emotions. Since
4Later I provide more defence for the claim that music captures the felt sensation of emotions.
5Note that since the arousal I identify can take the form of simulated bodily changes or attenuated bodily
changes, this view is compatible with the possibility that one have an additional and simultaneous emotional
response which one identifies as one’s own (e.g. schadenfreude or sympathy). For instance, the other’s
response may be simulated whilst one’s own is realized with actual physiological changes, or different
emotional mechanisms may simply be active at the same time. One may then experience a mixed emotional
feeling, or one’s attention may successively shift from one aspect of the experience to another.
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bodily gestures and vocal utterances can be perceived as expressive of
emotions, then things that seem like bodily gestures or vocal utterances
could also be perceived as expressive of emotions.
Beginning with the resemblance between music and vocal utterances, we
can see that the contour of a melody may directly resemble the rise in pitch
at the end of a question, or the emphasis on certain words. However, these
aspects of vocal expressions may not be as significant in providing their
emotional effects as their more detailed tonal qualities. It is known for
instance that infants respond to the emotional inflection in their mother’s
voice without having to understand the propositional content of her words.
Psychologist Mechthild Papousek [1996] has shown that when speaking to
infants, mothers will use sharp, staccato contours to express disapproval
and slower, falling pitch contours to soothe.6 The expressive qualities of
these kinds of details have been verified in empirical studies [e.g. Scherer
et al. 2003]. For example, increases in the fundamental frequency (F0) of the
voice and its degree of variation, an upward F0 contour, increased
articulation rate and intensity all indicate greater arousal. Specific emotions
can also be distinguished by the particular pattern of variables. For
example, anxiety is characterised by an increase in F0, but low variation and
low intensity. Music is clearly able to imitate as well as to exaggerate all of
these basic non-verbal features.7
Yet although the resemblance to vocal utterances goes some way towards
grounding the expressive qualities of music, it is insufficient to account for
all cases of musical expression. For example, the broader melodic, harmonic
and rhythmic features of a piece of music seem expressive in a way that does
not resemble any of the variables mentioned above. Consequently, Davies
and Kivy also appeal to resemblance with bodily movements and posture
(for Davies [2005] this is primary). Melodic lines can seem graceful or heavy,
they can jump or droop and chords can seem tense or gentle. The means by
which music may resemble motion includes variations in volume, articula-
tion, rhythm, texture and pitch. These combined resources seem sufficient to
capture virtually any type of movement imaginable.
How this connection between musical and bodily movement is made
requires a bit more explanation. But first we should explain how
resemblance would solve our problem. I’ve endorsed the view that
physiological arousal, or at least a neural simulation of such arousal, is
necessary to recognize emotions in others. If music resembles expressive
behaviour, we can now go some way towards explaining how this arousal
occurs, again by looking at the case of empathy. First of all, given that
emotions are necessarily constituted by patterns of bodily change, arousal
requires that some of the same bodily changes (or a neural simulation of
those changes) happening in the other person are replicated in the
empathizer. Since this process must be triggered by the perception of the
other person, it is clear that the empathizer can only imitate those bodily
changes that he is able to perceive. The most obvious perceivable changes
6Cf. Storr [1992: 23].
7Music also has the capacity to imitate other specific cues such as sighs, tremors, hoarseness, weeping or
laughing, though only in a highly stylized way, and as such not particularly accurately.
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are to the other’s expressive behaviour, such as his posture, bodily gestures,
facial and vocal expressions.
Recall that expressive behaviour counts as one kind of bodily change that
generates emotional feelings. Hence if the empathizer behaves expressively,
this will generate a range of bodily changes that are characteristic of the
overall emotional pattern. These could in turn trigger other physiological
changes which typically accompany such expressive behaviour because of
sub-personal association mechanisms. However, whether or not these
internal bodily changes are also imitated, the imitation of expressive
behaviour should generate sufficient arousal to allow recognition of the
emotional state.
The phenomenon of emotional contagion, such as panicking when those
around you start to panic, or laughing when those around you are laughing,
despite not knowing the reason in either case, shows that we can be aroused
by another’s emotional state as a result of observing it.8 Emotional
contagion is explained as the result of unconsciously imitating the expressive
behaviour of others [Hatfield et al. 1994]. Yet this imitation need not be
overt. It has been observed that adult humans tend to tense the muscles
required to perform an action when viewing another person performing that
action [Fadiga et al. 1995]. There is also subtle activation of people’s facial
muscles when perceiving emotional expressions [Dimberg et al. 2000].9
Finally, the by now well-known discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ has helped to
explain how imitation is achieved. These neurons, which have recently been
confirmed to exist in human brains,10 fire both when the subject performs an
action and when it perceives another performing that same action [Gallese &
Goldman 1998]. Mirror neurons indicate a neural level of action mirroring,
allowing the perceiver to recreate the motor plans of the other person. As
such, they most likely ground a person’s capacity to actually imitate the
other’s actions.
We are also in a position to hypothesize a plausible connection between
Damasio’s as-if loop and the mirror neuron system. Recall that the as-if
loop simulates bodily changes and that these include changes in expressive
movement. The activation of mirror neurons which monitor the expressive
movements of others may activate the neurons responsible for monitoring
(and simulating) the same expressive movements in oneself. Note, however,
that the central claim about mirror neurons is that they activate both when
an action is engaged in and when it is perceived. So it may well be the case
that the very same neurons realize both the mapping of one’s own expressive
behaviours and the mapping of another’s expressive behaviours. The as-if
loop and the mirror neuron system may partially overlap. In either system,
neural activity can stimulate actual motor activity. Similarly, links within
the as-if loop to neurons mapping/simulating other physiological changes
are liable to trigger a recreation of such physiological changes and perhaps
the changes themselves. Below I will also suggest ways in which music could
8Davies [forthcoming] has recently connected musical expression to what he calls ‘attentional’ emotional
contagion in explaining how people can be aroused by music. Cf. also Robinson [2006: Ch. 13].
9Cited in Damasio [2004: 312].
10Slack [2007].
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more directly activate the simulation of physiological changes other than
expressive behaviour.
So we are gradually building a picture in which mirroring expressive
behaviour stimulates neural activity which arouses an emotional feeling, and
which is then perceived as belonging to the other person. Similarly in the
case of music, we hypothesize that the aural presentation of movement is
mirrored, resulting in a sense of feeling belonging to the music.11 We must
now address some potentially problematic differences between the cases of
music and empathy.
First of all, how exactly is this mirroring achieved? In the case of
empathy, it is necessary that the visual or audible data of the other person’s
behaviour must be somehow converted into motor plans for producing the
same behaviour. However, forming a motor plan of another’s visually or
aurally perceived behaviour requires a translation of that information into a
form that can be directly mirrored. One does not directly mirror the visual
look of a person but a first person sense of behavioural movement.
Similarly, the perceived resemblance between music and motion is more
problematic than that between music and vocal utterances because it must
operate between different sense modalities, between sound and either
kinaesthetic motion or tactile feeling.
Kivy claims that we connect modalities, attributing spatial positions to
pitch, for instance, because of constant associations gathered from everyday
life, such as engines whining higher as they use more energy to lift something
from the ground [1980: 55]. However, we also hear deep booming sounds
from the sky when it thunders. So why should the association between low
sounds and low positions be so consistently perceived? It seems that the way
we describe pitches as spatially higher or lower is simply entrenched in our
language (and hence in our thought). In other cultures, high and low pitches
are described as weak and strong (among the African Bashi), white and
black (among the Lau of the Solomon Islands), or small and big (among the
African Basongye) [Merriam 1964].12 Despite the differences here, these
alternative descriptions make sense to us. They are all highly analogous to
our descriptions of high and low, and indicate a universality of applying
intermodal metaphors to musical pitch.
We can also provide a deeper explanation for this convention by appeal to
the general intermodality of our perceptual processing. First of all, the fact
that our own behavioural movements are presented to us in multimodal
form can help explain how we make the same association when perceiving
the behaviour of others. We not only see, as well as feel, our own bodily
movements, we also hear, as well as feel, our own vocalizations. Moreover,
our perception of the world is generally geared towards multimodal
presentation. Physical movements, as well as the textures of surfaces, are
often presented to us visually, audibly and in tactile form.
11Neuroscientists Molnar-Szakacs and Overy [2006] similarly hypothesize that recognizing emotions in music
is grounded by the mirror neuron system. However, they focus on mirroring the intentional actions required
to produce the movements we perceive in music rather than the more generalized mirroring of bodily patterns
(some of which could be generated by deliberate actions).
12Cited in Davies [1994: 231–2].
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It is also known that the senses can influence each other in our recognition
of objects. It has been observed, for instance, that when subjects are
presented with a single visual flash accompanied by two audible beeps, or
two tactile taps, they have a corresponding impression of two visual flashes.
The illusion persists even when subjects know that only a single flash is
presented, suggesting that it is a feature of early stages of perceptual
processing [Violentyev et al. 2005].
A more extreme example of the connection between modalities is the
phenomenon of synaesthesia, where subjects report sensations of colours
when hearing sounds, or shapes when tasting food. These multimodal
stimulations are fairly rare, although certain ‘pseudo’ synaesthetic associa-
tions are much more common. A well-known test of this association is to
have people look at two pictures, one similar to an inkblot and the other like
a piece of shattered glass and to ask which one is called ‘bouba’ and which
called ‘kiki’. Nearly all subjects name the inkblot ‘bouba’ and the jagged
picture ‘kiki’ [Ramachandran & Hubbard 2003].
Thus there is good evidence for all sorts of reciprocal connections between
the sense modalities. It seems that many different forms of sensory
information (frequency amplitude, brightness, hue, texture, solidity) are
reduced to a sense of movement or three-dimensional shape, flexible
between any particular form of presentation.13 Furthermore, this reduction,
or convergence of sensory data, is not achieved by any additional neural
module. Although the brain is organized into linear columns of neurons that
perform the various stages of sensory processing, there are also lateral
connections between modalities at every stage. As such there is a
continuous bi-directional flow of information within both these linear and
lateral streams. The apparent result is that the input from different sense
modalities is integrated right from the beginning of processing, not as a final
stage.
So, in just the same way as we intuitively label a jagged visual shape ‘kiki’
and an inkblot ‘bouba’, our brains systematically link sounds and spatial
movement or shape. It seems conceivable that we could link high sounds
with low positions and dark colours rather than the reverse. Yet we can
agree with Kivy that the greater amount of real objects and processes that
link high sounds with high positions and light colours makes it more likely
that our normal intermodal associations will develop. And once these
associations are neurally fixed, they will be applied across the board.
4. Resemblance Must Connect to Feelings
We have grounds for automatically perceiving a resemblance between music
and movement. Davies and Kivy, accordingly, go a long way towards
explaining the expressive capacities of music, and the fact that music may
resemble both bodily movement and vocal utterances. However, I think that
13Antonio Damasio also describes experiments where both adults and children spontaneously describe the
movements of a chip moving on a screen in emotional terms [Damasio 2000: 70].
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these resemblances are a means for music to provide a deeper resemblance
to the feeling of an emotion, not merely its outward appearance. This is
partly motivated by my view of emotions. Emotions are constituted by
patterns of bodily changes and their experience is centrally characterized by
the feeling of those bodily changes. Given this, it is intuitive to suppose that
if music is so good at expressing emotions, then it should be because it
captures the experience of undergoing bodily changes.
More importantly it is the nature of expression to give us a sense of what
the expressed state is like. Davies claims that hearing an emotion in music is
no more involved than recognising sadness in the mask that traditionally
denotes tragedy [Davies 1997: 97]. But it is quite possible to stare at that
mask and get the impression of genuine feeling. Of course I can treat it as a
symbol referring to sadness in the same way as the word ‘sad’ does. But in
the case we are interested in, my recognition is supposed to rely on my
sensitivity to a resemblance between qualities of the visual form and
qualities of the emotion itself.14 Emotions are not appearances, they are
mental states. So Davies and Kivy fail to recognize that what makes sad
facial expressions expressive of sad emotions (even when not actually driven
by emotion) is a connection that is forged between visual qualities and the
qualities of the emotional state.15
In addition, by restricting the resemblance capacity of music to the
outward appearance of emotions, Davies and Kivy unduly restrict the facets
of emotions that music is able to express. One example is the visceral sickly
feeling that is so well captured by the quiet unsynchronized glissandi of a
violin section. In this case, the expressive effect relies on making an
intermodal connection between sound and the tactile sense of pressure and
motion. Recall that on the view of emotions introduced at the beginning of
this paper, these feelings can directly manipulate an emotional experience.
Yet the intermodal connection must go beyond the mere sense of vibration if
it is to convey sickliness. So although one need not simulate expressive
behaviour here, one must still simulate the bodily changes that would
generate this sense of sickliness. And since it is possible to imagine feelings
of sickliness, it is plausible that changes responsible for such feelings can be
automatically simulated under the guidance of music.16
In general neither timbral nor harmonic tension are adequately captured
by the appearance theorist. Yet these sorts of characteristics add a great deal
to the expressive qualities of the music. I can think of no vocal or
behavioural gesture that captures the peculiar nutty quality of a bassoon for
instance. But the timbre of a bassoon suggests a certain feel of solidity that
affects the overall emotional feeling.17 Moreover there are additional
dynamic aspects to our experience of emotions that music could be taken to
14If one defers to the resemblance between the mask and a real sad face, then one simply pushes the question
back to why real faces are expressive of emotion.
15Cf. Robinson [2006: 309].
16Davies has said to me that the effects of music due to timbre may simply be another channel to expression.
However, there is no clear reason to motivate a distinction like this other than to protect the appearance
resemblance theory. Timbre is very closely related to both harmonic texture and dynamics, all of which have
an easily discernible resemblance to tactile and proprioceptive feeling. The arguments from intermodality and
simulation provide a unified account of resemblance.
17Vocal timbre similarly conveys a sense of the speaker’s body.
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resemble. For example, sometimes the thoughts we have during emotions
have characteristic dynamic qualities such as being unable to concentrate on
one thing for more than a few moments, or the inability to change one’s
mind when depressed. So one could potentially be guided by the dynamic
qualities of the music to simulate (probably more consciously) these sorts of
thought dynamics. Another possibility is more unusual: that one imagine
the temporal development of a long-term emotion like love compressed into
a few minutes, whilst preserving certain structural features such as an initial
hesitancy that gradually becomes consistently passionate. Ultimately it
seems just as reasonable to characterize the entire phenomenology of an
emotional state as languid, restless or clumsy as it does a behavioural
gesture [cf. Pratt 1931].18 So why should we limit music’s resemblance to just
the outward form of emotions?
On the basis of appearance theories, we may also wonder why music is
commonly accorded the distinction of most emotionally expressive art as
opposed to (unaccompanied) dance, which can resemble the gestural
aspects of emotions far more accurately. The appearance theorist may
respond that music has the advantage over dance that it can resemble
vocal utterances in addition to bodily gestures. Yet the quality of the
expressiveness of music seems far deeper than an extra sort of
resemblance could account for. It seems that music can absorb listeners
and carry them along with the progress of an emotional state in a way
quite foreign to other art forms.
There is a very simple reason why music is superior to the other art forms
in its expressive capacity. It is because sound is more like tactile feeling than
any other sense modality, and tactile feeling is a central part of emotional
feeling (taking tactile feeling to include feelings of pressure, heat and motion
within the body as well as at its surface). In many ways the two senses
overlap one another. It is worth noting that our sense of hearing evolved
from a refinement of our sense of touch. The evolutionary ancestor of the
eardrum is a bone in the sides of fish that functions to sense pressure
variations in water.19 Sound, more than sight, is experienced in terms of
vibration (although sight also relies on vibrations, it is not experienced as
such). A loud sound literally feels a certain way. In addition, friction and
movement typically generate sound, meaning that sound is a constant
accompaniment to our kinaesthetic and tactile experiences. Finally, both
feeling and hearing parse the world in similar ways. They share similar
qualities of both abstraction and immediacy. The way that feelings structure
experience is not in terms of discrete disconnected objects so much as
ongoing actions and textural contrasts. Similarly sound (and particularly
music) is understood in terms of continuous streams of movement and
timbral contrasts. As Kendall Walton notes, we are much more likely to get
emotionally involved in sounds if only because we don’t objectify and
18Cited in Budd [1985: 39]. Budd similarly recognizes the resemblance to the general phenomenology of
feeling [1995: 207].
19Nussbaum [2007: 51–4] discusses this point at length, noting the ‘strong affinity’ between sound and tactile
feeling.
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distance ourselves from them the way we do with our visual experience.20
As a result, music literally resonates with feeling.
Overall, then, I agree with Malcolm Budd and Carroll Pratt that music
sounds the way that emotions feel. Via a variety of resources, music is able
to fully capture the dynamic and visceral qualities of emotional feelings,
which we are able to simulate using the resources we possess for
monitoring our own and others’ emotions. Since the inner experience of
emotions is primarily characterized by the temporal development of these
qualities, it is no wonder that music is the pre-eminent art form of
emotional expression.
5. Persona Enables Resemblance
If we agree that we are sensitive to a resemblance between music and
emotional feelings, there is one final piece of the puzzle required in order
to fully account for the causal story of musical expression. It is a
philosophical truism that anything can resemble anything else. So why is
music taken to resemble human movement rather than any other kind of
movement? I have argued that music hijacks the simulation mechanism
which recognizes the actions and emotions of other people. But why does
the simulation mechanism get activated at all? In addition, my rejection of
the appearance theories of Davies and Kivy leaves my account open to the
problem that their theories resolved. If the music expresses the actual
feeling of an emotion rather than merely its appearance, then there should
be someone to whom that emotion belongs. The arousal theory was
rejected for failing to concentrate on the music itself. So how is it that we
can properly focus on the music itself whilst still holding that it expresses
an actual emotion?
I believe the gap here can be filled by persona theory. Persona theory
argues that when we hear a piece of music as emotionally expressive, we
necessarily imagine or have an illusion that a person is appropriately
connected to that emotional expression.21 The person we imagine need not
be any actual person; it may only be connected to that specific piece of
music.
Now the fundamental purpose of the persona is to make the recognition
of emotions in the music intelligible. It should therefore be impossible to
hear an emotion in the music without having also imagined a persona. But
what makes a listener think of a persona? There are two possible strategies
here. The first is that it is a fairly automatic illusion. The second is that it is a
more deliberate imaginative activity. As justification for the first possibility,
it is very likely that whenever we approach a work of art we have a
20Walton [1997: 78], noting our tendency to experientially separate sounds from their sources, says,
We reify or objectify feelings and sensations, as we do sounds, and we conceptualize them and our
relations to them in similar ways. We think of feelings of exuberance or anguish as entities distinct
from their sources, and sometimes as leaving their sources and surrounding or entering us. A feeling,
like a sound, may come over me. It may permeate my consciousness.
21E.g. Cone [1974], Vermazen [1986] and especially Levinson [2005].
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background belief that it has been deliberately constructed by a human
being. As such we will tend automatically to interpret that work as the
product of certain mental states, and derive the nature of those mental states
from the characteristics of the work. In neurological terms, this means that
we confront works of art in just the same way as we confront people, which,
I would suggest, primes our simulation capacity from the start. For
example, if I see a person stub his toe, I don’t have to deliberately engage my
simulation mechanism in order to appreciate the pain that this will
engender. Rather I immediately get a sense of the painful consequences of
this action. So, similarly, when we listen to music, our background belief
that a person is responsible for the work could prime the simulation
mechanism. The music then only need give us the merest hint of a person
(i.e. by resembling person-like movements) to trigger the mechanisms geared
towards understanding people.22
The alternative is to assume that the listener does not approach the music
with the background belief that it is produced by a human and their
simulation mechanism is not primed. This is more common when listening
to purely natural sounds such as a tap dripping. Again, we still immediately
get a sense of movement from the sound of the dripping water, and if we
concentrate upon that sound we can even get a tactile sense of the vibrations
that this movement would generate. However, we do not perceive any
emotional qualities in this sound. At this point then, the listener may now
deliberately imagine that a person is responsible for producing this sound.
For instance, that a person is flicking the drops of water from a brush. This
will then trigger the simulation process, and generate a sense of the way it
feels to perform those actions that would produce those sounds in that
precise manner. Depending on the properties of the sound, this may seem to
have emotional qualities or not. For instance, the sound of the tap dripping
may now appear to have a nonchalant quality it didn’t have before.
The above example provides an informal test of the simulation theory I
have offered. Empirical verification is also available given the direct
connection I have made between our capacity for empathy and our capacity
to recognize emotions in music. In particular, people with autism are usually
characterized as lacking the ability to understand other minds. This is
attributed either to a lack of a theory of mind or an inability to simulate the
internal states of others. So we should anticipate that autistic subjects are
unable to understand expressive music.23 Little has been done to confirm
this hypothesis, yet in one experiment conducted, autistic subjects were in
fact able to successfully identify the emotions presented in music [Heaton
et al. 1999]. Unfortunately, this experiment only asked autistic subjects to
identify emotions in music that they were already able to identify in other
people. If they can recognize when a person is sad or happy then we should
expect them to recognize the same in music.
22Kivy [1980: 59] similarly points to a general ‘animating tendency’ to imbue natural objects with human
characteristics. As he says, ‘far from being difficult to hear or see things as animate, it is, apparently, difficult
not to’.
23Similarly, where people with Huntington’s disease confuse expressions of fear and anger, we should expect
them to also confuse music that expresses fear or anger.
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It is uncertain what it is exactly that autistic people are unable to do, and
there are likely to be several interacting factors that lead to the disorder. If
autism is caused by a dysfunction in the simulation mechanism (such as a
lack of mirror neurons) then autistic subjects should not be able to process
the emotional content of music at all beyond a level they are capable of
achieving for people. If instead the problem is more to do with attributing
the results of simulative processing, then we may expect that whilst autistic
subjects could be contagiously aroused by the expressive qualities of music,
any conscious recognition of emotion would be phrased in egoistic terms.
Autistic subjects would not ascribe the emotion to some other persona, and
possibly not even as caused by the music.
6. Conclusion
In summary, the causal story I have presented is that music expresses
emotions by hijacking the simulation mechanism that has evolved to detect
one’s own and other people’s emotions. This simulation mechanism is
triggered either by a background belief or an active imagination of the
agency involved in generating the sound. The simulation mechanism utilizes
the intermodal connection between the sounds and movement that the brain
makes at all times. These movements are then mirrored from a first person
perspective, which, if they display an emotional pattern, will arouse a
simulation of that emotion in the listener. So far all of this can happen
unconsciously. The listener may even be fully aroused by an emotion
without recognizing that it is caused by the properties of the music. This
would be like a case of emotional contagion. If, however, the listener is
paying conscious attention to the music then they will perceive that music as
having the properties of feeling that their simulation process has generated.
They will then be disposed to verbally identify the expressive content of the
music accordingly. So because the judgment is conscious, and one is
generally aware that the properties of the music are responsible for one’s
judgment, this is more like a case of empathy than one of emotional
contagion.
This brings us to the end of the causal story of musical expression and the
emergence of the conscious experience of identifying emotional content in
music. To finish, two final remarks can be made regarding which account of
the experience of music this causal story seems to best support.
First of all, my account is guided by the idea that a pattern of feeling is
perceived as a property of the music. We don’t require two ideas; one of the
music and another of the feeling. This is because the brain automatically
makes an intermodal connection between the two forms of sensation,
combining them into a single percept of the dynamic qualities of the music.
As a result, we should look for comparable phenomenological accounts, for
example, the visual perception of the solidity of an object. Just as when I see
a wooden beam I also perceive its solidity, so when I perceive the music I
also perceive its feeling. This is analogous to the way we perceive emotional
feelings in the facial or vocal expressions of other people. There are of
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course discernible features within those faces, which it is possible to attend
to in a purely technical manner. That is, it is possible to distinguish the facial
expression and the feeling. But the more common experience is just to
perceive the emotion in the face. Similarly we hear the emotion in the
music.24
Second, because the simulation mechanisms I have invoked to explain
expressivity are functionally geared towards tracking the emotions of
people, it is plausible that the results of such processing would give the
impression of a person. So it looks like a version of the persona theory, such
as that defended by Jerrold Levinson [2005], is supported by the causal
considerations I have presented. Levinson’s concept of a persona is fairly
minimal so there may be several ways in which the persona could be
characterized or identified in the imagination of the listener. One point
worth noting, however, is that if one adopts the theory of emotions that I
have employed here, it looks as though to have a sense of feelings is to have
a sense of a person’s body connected to that feeling. This is what emotional
feelings are, meaningful presentations of the impact of the world on the
bodily organism or self. Hence one would need to emphasize the imaginative
connection to an embodied rather than disembodied persona.25
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